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A Proposal for 
Funding Legal Services 
Howard Roitman 
Connecticut may have found a way of 
transforming the baser elements into gold. At least, that 
seems to be the effect of a bill that the State Treasurer has 
prepared for introduction in the 1973 session of the 
General Assembly. The bill, which is designed to ease the 
financial plight of the Connecticut Commission on the Arts, 
offers the possibility of a novel funding mechanism for 
other activities including legal services for those who cannot 
otherwise afford them. This article will describe the 
Connecticut plan, explore possible difficulties with it in the 
light of the Internal Revenue Code, and propose a model 
statute for the plan's application to legal services. 
Background 
The Connecticut State Commission on the Arts 
was created in 1965, and consists of twenty-five members 
"broadly representative of all fields of the performing and 
fine arts," appointed by the President Pro Tempore of the 
Senate, the Speaker of the House, and the Governor. Its 
duties are primarily to "encourage, within the state, 
participation in, and promotion, development, acceptance 
and appreciation of, artistic and cultural activities." The 
Commission was designed to be the state agency for 
disbursement of funds within its jurisdiction, and thus be 
the recipient of federal, state and private monies for that 
purpose. 1 
Since its creation, the Commission has been 
hampered in it's work by a severe lack of funds. While there 
have been some state appropriations, which have been 
matched with federal funds, the amount of private 
contributions has been disappointing. The Commission has 
therefore been anxious for the state to provide more 
funding, something the state thus far has been loath to do. 
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Connecticut Foundation for the Arts 
In response to the requests of the Commission, 
the State Treasurer, Robert Berdon, has drafted a bill 
establishing the Connecticut Foundation for the Arts, a 
nonprofit corporation, whose function will be to provide 
supplementary funds for the Commission. The Foundation 
is Berdon's brainchild. He perceived both the necessity of 
increased funds for the Commission if it were to operate 
effectively, and the likely disinclinatio11. of the Governor to 
request, and the Legislature to grant, more aid to the arts. 
The statutory mechanism is designed to get around both 
obstacles. 
The Foundation is to be governed by a board of 
directors selected by the Commission, with the exception 
of the Treasurer and Executive Director of the Commission, 
who are members ex officio. The board has the power to 
grant or loan money for programs and activities that have 
been approved by the Commission. The other major power 
of the Foundation is to "accept, hold, and administer" the 
property and monies of the Commission. 
The bill provides that any corporation, 
association, or person may make tax-deductible contri-
butions to the corporation, with such contributions being 
allowed as double deductions for the first five years of the 
Commission's life. Although Connecticut does not have a 
personal income tax, there are corporation, franchise, and 
insurance taxes that may be reduced under this provision. 
The corporation is made tax-exempt, as well. 
The heart of the bill is an authorization for the 
treasurer to loan to the Foundation up to ten million 
dollars, for periods of up to one year, at the riet interest 
rate that the state would have to pay for its short-term 
borrowings. The treasurer may make such loans from the 
General Fund, a combined investment pool established by 
the state, or by the issuance of state bonds. 
The treasurer has expressed the hope that loans 
from the state will fill the temporary needs of the 
Commission, and thereby encourage private contributions, 
particularly from corporations. It is anticipated that the 
amount of state loans will gradually decrease from the ten 
million dollar authorization. In fact, the bill makes 
provision for legislative termination of the corporation 
when need for it no longer exists. 
A quick overview of the bill would suggest that 
the Commission is merely getting short-term loans which it 
has to repay at the same rate of interest that the state must 
pay to get its money. The Commission would still appear 
unable to make extensive grants to the arts, since the 
money must be repaid. However, the Commission does, in 
fact, get a healthy income from these transactions, without 
any cost to the state. The source of income lies in the 
spread between the interest the state must pay to borrow 
short-term money and the return the treasurer can get by 
investing the money borrowed. 2 
1 C.S.G.A. § § 10)69, 370, 373. 
2 This analysis and the figures used are 
based on interviews with Mr. Robert 
Berdon, the State Treasurer. 
3 Comment: Intergovernmental Tax 
Immunities: An Analysis and Suggested 
Approach to the Doctrine and Its 
Application to State and Municipal Bond 
Interest, 15 Villanova L. R. 414, 439 
(Winter, 1970). 
The bill actually provides that the Foundation 
must pay interest as described, but never at more than three 
per cent. This is a realistic figure for the interest the state 
currently must pay on its short-term borrowing. 
(Connecticut can now borrow at approximately 2.8 per 
cent.) The reason for such a favorable rate for state 
borrowing is, of course, the tax considerations: interest 
earned on state obligations is not included in gross income 
for federal income tax purposes. The state lends the ten 
million dollars it has obtained at 2.8 per cent interest to the 
Foundation, which in return pays 2.8 per cent to reimburse 
the state. Once it receives these loans, the Foundation, 
through the treasurer, can place the money in the 
investments specified for the treasurer. Treasurer Berdon 
estimates the spread between the return earned on the 
investment and the 2.8 rate of interest to be, 
conservatively, 3.8 per cent, making available $380,000 
each year for the Commission to use in fulfillment of its 
goals. 
Where does that money really come from? The 
state comes out even, since it receives from the Foundation 
all the money it has loaned, together with the interest it has 
paid. The Commission is ahead $380,000. It is the federal 
treasury that foots the bill, in the form of tax revenue 
forgone through the exclusion from income of interest 
earned on state obligations. The exclusion represents an 
indirect federal subsidy to the states, the scope of which is 
determined by the states. (The total federal tax loss from 
the municipal bond interest exemption has been estimated 
at $2 billion. 3 ) 
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An observer may wonder why the state does 
n~t.employ this mechanism more frequently, as a way of 
ra1smg revenue for all kinds of purposes. The explanation 
suggests a possible Achilles' heel of the entire proposal: § 
103 of the Internal Revenue Code, which defines the scope 
of the state and municipal bond exemption. Section 103 
raises enough questions about the proposal to merit 
reproducing the relevant parts completely: 
a Gross income does not include interest on ---- 1 the obligations of a state ... or any political 
subdivision of any of the foregoing ... 
____ ct_ Except as provided in this subsection, any 
arbitrage bond shall be treated as an obligation 
not described in subsection a l . 
2 For purposes of this subsection, the term 
"arbitrage bond" means any obligation which is 
issued as part of an issue all or a major portion of 
the proceeds of which are reasonably expected to 
be used directly or indirectly-
A to acquire securities ... or obligations (other 
than obligations described in subsection 
a l which may be reasonably expected at 
the time of issuance of such issue, to 
produce a yield over the term of the issue 
which is materially higher (taking into 
account any discoun.t or premium) than the 
yield on obligations of such issue, or 
B to replace funds which were used directly or 
indirectly to acquire securities or obligations 
described in subparagraph A ... 
4 For purposes of paragraph l , an obligation shall 
not be treated as an arbitrage bond solely by 
reason of the fact that-
A the proceeds of the issue of which such 
obligation is a part may be invested for a 
temporary period in securities or other 
obligations until such proceeds are needed 
for the purpose for which such issue was 
issued 
§ 103 d is of recent vintage, and the Internal 
Revenue Service has not yet had much to say in the way of 
interpretation. Temporary regulations have been issued. But 
these do not really speak to our questions, except to make 
clear that the yield anticipated by the treasurer is indeed 
"materially higher" under d 2 A .4 
Treasurer Berdon believes that his proposal is 
safe from loss under § l 03 d of the state and municipal 
bond interest exemption. He reasons that it is not the state 
that is reinvesting the proceeds in higher yield securities and 
obligations, but rather a private corporation. The state, he 
claims, has no control over what that corporation does with 
the money that is loaned to it by the state. It is this 
r~aso~ing that required the creation of the corporation, 
smce 1f the loans were made directly to the Commission the 
reinvestment would be made by a state agency. 
. . The treasurer's reasoning is not entirely 
convmcmg. In the first place, the definition of arbitrage 
bonds.' which do not qualify for the state and municipal 
bond mterest exemption, includes those whose proceeds are 
to be used "indirectly" to acquire higher yield securities. 
Although the Service has not yet proferred a definition of 
"indirectly" for the purposes of this section, it would seem 
that the proceeds of the Connecticut bond issue would, at 
the v~r.y least, be used "indirectly" to purchase higher yield 
secunt1es. 
Whether Connecticut can get around this 
problem by making the loan to a separate entity is also 
unclear. The Service, and subsequently a court could chose 
to ignore, as a sham, the attempt to attach a p;ivate body 
to a state agency merely to avoid the arbitrage definition. 
Furthermore, the section does· not specify that it is the 
state which must make the investment in order for the 
bonds to be included in d 2 A . The section is framed in 
terms of the investment and not the investor. It is thus 
possible that a loan to, and investment by, an 
unquestionably private, independent entity would fall 
under d 2 A and not qualify for the a I exemption. 
It may be noted that a proposal to fund legal services by 
such a scheme may fare better in the courts than the 
present Connecticut proposal, as loans could be made 
directly to private legal services organizations without the 
necessity of setting up a clearly sham private corporation. 
There may be a safer way around the d 2 A 
exclusion from favorable treatment. The treasurer does not 
actually anticipate that a bond issue is necessary to raise the 
Foundation's ten million dollars. Instead, this relatively 
small ~mount is already available from prior, much larger 
bond issues, and is sitting in the General Fund and other 
sources that the treasurer is authorized to tap for loans to 
the Foundation. This particular fact situation may allow 
the Connecticut proposal to escape the definition of 
"arbitrage bond" of d 2 , which requires the investment 
of "all or a major portion of the proceeds." 
These facts, and the short term nature of the 
loans to the Foundation, may get the scheme within the 
bounds of d 4 A , since the investment will be somewhat 
temporary in character. Whether this approach is allowed 
will depend on the Service's interpretation of "temporary." 
The present temporary regulations, however, also indicate 
that some limit may be set on the yield from temporary 
investment, which (although greater than .125%) may cause 
re-evaluation of the soundness of the proposal. 
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Clearly, these speculations are of limited use 
without an indication of how the Internal Revenue Service 
will view the proposal. Such an indication is probably not 
far off, as new regulations in this area have been promised 
for quite some time. However, it is unlikely that the 
question will be finally resolved with their issuance. Even if 
the new regulations impose no new obstacles in the way of 
the proposal there are already sufficient obstacles in the 
section for the Service to move against the practice if it 
wishes. Even if the Service does not rule against this 
proposal, it is clear by the promulgation of subsection< d) 
and regulations under it, that this is an area of concern to 
the Internal Revenue Service. It seems inevitable that there 
will eventually be a clash between the states and the Service 
over the reinvestment of funds raised by tax-free state 
bonds. Such a conflict would, of course, be of 
constitutional proportions. 
Although the history of Treasury attempts to 
change or eliminate the municipal bond immunity of§ 103 
(a) is some fifty years old, the existence of the exemption 
in the law has by and large, kept the constitutional debate 
out of the courts. 5 Absent the statutory exemption, the 
question of whether the federal government may tax the 
income from municipal obligations will revolve around the 
constitutional doctrine of "reciprocal" or 
"intergovernmental" immunity, said to be a cornerstone of 
our federalist system. 
The Supreme Court affirmed the municipal 
bond immunity on constitutional grounds in such cases as 
Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, affd 
on rehearing, 158 U.S. 601 (1895); and National life 
Insurance Co. v. United States, 277 U.S. 508 ( 1928). 
However, later cases have apparently narrowed the 
immunity by asking the question in particular instances of 
whether the alleged federal encroachments on the 
immunity threaten functions that are essential to the 
continued existence of the states. These cases have also 
repudiated the doctrine that a tax on income is the 
equivalent of a tax on the income's source (the municipal 
government). Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405 ( 1938); 
Graves v. New York, ex rel. O'Keefe 306 U.S. 466 (1939). 
Thus, whether there is a constitutional exemption of 
income from municipal bonds from federal taxation is still 
considered to be an open question. 
The State's Power to Borrow 
By statute, the State treasurer may issue 
bonds-either with the Governor's approval for temporary 
borrowing, or as the state bond commission deems 
necessary, even in the case of bond issues authorized by 
statute. The treasurer is authorized by the proposed new 
bill to issue bonds to finance the loans to the Foundation. 
4 Regulation § 13.4 (a)(3) provides that 
the yield will be considered "materially 
higher" if the difference between the 
yield on the acquired obligations and the 
yield produced by the governmental 
obligations is greater than one-eighth of 
one percent. 
5 Martori and Bliss, Taxation of Municipal 
Bond Interest-Interesting Speculation 
and One Step Forward, 44 Notre Dame 
Lawyer 191, 192 (Dec., 1968). 
6 See C.G.S.A. 3-16 through 3-31 for the 
treasurer's powers of borrowing and 
investment. 
There exists presently a statutory limitation on 
the amount of bonds that may be issued by the treasurer. 
He is limited to bonds, notes, etc., in a total amount up to 
four and a half times the tax receipts of the previous fiscal 
year. The treasurer estimates that of the 4.4 billion dollar 
limitation on bonds by this section, some two billion 
dollars worth have been issued. Of course, this limitation is 
not constitutional in nature, and may be changed by statute 
at any time. 
Funding Legal Services 
There appears to be no reason why a similar 
proposal could not be used to fund legal services 
organizations. Certainly from a tax point of view, there is 
no greater disability on a legal services proposal than on the 
one for the Foundation on the Arts. Indeed, as mentioned 
above, there would be no temptation for IRS to "pierce the 
corporate veil" of a "private" corporation, because there is 
no need to set up an intermediate corporation to fund legal 
service organizations. 
There may, of course, be some political 
obstacles to the passage of such a proposal. There is the 
suspicion that this "money machine" is, in fact, costing the 
state money, which must be assuaged. One of Treasurer 
Berdon's selling points for the Foundation is that it is 
merely a temporary measure to get the Commission going 
so that it may then attract private contributions. At least in 
public the treasurer is hopeful that the state's monetary 
role in the scheme will expire within the five year double 
deduction period of the bill. The same argument could 
probably not be made for a legal services loan proposal. 
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Despite the fact that it would not cost the state 
anything, any such bill would raise all of the questions 
about legal services and state support that are currently 
being debated. A discussion of these political battles is 
beyond the scope of this short article, except to note that 
this debate is likely to continue, despite the present lack of 
state financial support. 
It should also be noted that the sum of money 
involved in a legal services proposal might well be 
considerably more than the sum involved in the fine arts 
plan, although this would depend on whether a particular 
bill was designed to cover funding for all legal service 
programs in the state, or just a specific one, and on the size 
of the programs covered. The state, in theory, may be 
authorized to borrow more than enough money to finance 
legal services in the manner suggested. Thus, in 
Connecticut, up to 2.4 billion dollars more may be 
borrowed under the current borrowing limitation of the 
state. However, if the necessary state loan was raised to one 
hundred million dollars, for example, the public outcry 
would probably be intense. And in that case it would also 
be necessary, in the present Connecticut context, to have a 
separate bond issue, which would entail risks under the 
"arbitrage" definition. 
Model Act 
There follows a model act, which is patterned 
after Treasurer Berdon 's proposal, and is designed to 
effectuate the scheme outlined above for the financing of 
legal services programs. 
Several preliminary points should be made. 
First, there is no necessity, as discussed above, for the 
creation of a new entity to receive loans from the state. The 
only reason such an entity was felt to be necessary in 
Berdon's bill was that reinvestment by an obvious agency of 
the state, the Connecticut State Commission on the Arts, 
would bring the related state bond issue within the 
definition of "arbitrage Bond." Here, however, the 
reinvestment would be made by private legal service 
programs. 
On the other hand, in some situations the 
creation of an intermediate corporation entity would be 
desirable, for instance if a state-wide corporation is desired 
to disburse funds to all of the legal service programs in the 
state and to retain the investment function under perhaps 
closer scrutiny than is provided in the bill set out below. Of 
course, if scrutiny becomes too close, it may be that the 
advantages to be gained by having a separate entity are lost 
by the risk of the IRS "piercing the corporate veil." In any 
case, it was felt that such a separate entity was not a 
necessity, and no provision is made for it in the model act. 
Second, although the discussion and the model 
act are framed in the context of state loans, there appears 
to be no reason why the proposal could not be utilized on a 
municipal or county level. The provisions of§ 103 are 
equally applicable, and at most, an addition to the 
proposed enabling act might be necessary. A loan program 
on the local level might well be preferable to such a 
program on a state level because it would eliminate separate 
requests from each legal services program for funds, and 
fights between legal services programs over the allocation of 
funds. 
All these considerations should be kept in mind 
in the consideration of the act for any given jurisdiction. 
One further note: Certain terms, such as 
"combined investment pool," have been retained from the 
Connecticut proposal to give as broad a view of the 
proposal as possible. Appropriate language should, of 
course, be substituted in any other jurisdiction. 
Section I 
Loan of State moneys. 
Issue of note obligations. 
(a) The state treasurer is hereby authorized to loan to (X 
Legal Services Organization) from time to time amounts 
not to exceed Y million dollars outstanding at any one 
time, for such periods of time as he may determine but not 
to exceed one year, at a rate of interest as determined in 
subsection (b) of this section, such loans to be made under 
such other terms and conditions as he may determine. The 
state treasurer may make such loans from any one or a 
combination of the following: (i) the General Fund; (ii) the 
combined investment pool; (iii) the proceeds of notes of 
the state issued and sold pursuant to subparagraph (c) of 
this section. 
(b) The loans to said (Legal Services Organization) shall 
provide for interest payable to the combined investment 
pool to the extent that the loans are made from that pool, 
or to the General Fund to the extent they are made from 
other sources. The net interest rate shall be the current rate 
the state would have to pay for its short-term borrowings as 
may be determined and estimated by the state treasurer but 
in no event shall said interest rate exceed 3% per annum. 
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(c) The notes issued and sold by the state treasurer 
pursuant to (iii) of subsection (a) of this section shall be 
general obligations of the state and the full faith and credit 
of the State of Z are pledged for the payment of the 
principal of and interest on said notes as the same become 
due, and accordingly and as parts of the contract of the 
state with the holder of said notes, appropriation of all 
amounts necessary for punctual payments of such principal 
and interest is hereby made, and the treasurer shall pay 
from the general fund such principal and interest as the 
same become due. All of said notes shall be payable at such 
place or places as may be determined by the treasurer and 
shall bear such date or dates, mature at such time or times, 
not exceeding one year from their respective dates, bear 
interest at such rate and payable at such time or times, be 
in such denominations, and be payable in such medium of 
payment as may be determined by the treasurer. Any 
premium and accrued interest received on the sale of said 
notes shall go first to pay the cost of the sale and issuance 
of the notes and then the balance is credited to the General 
Fund. 
Section 2 
Es~blishment and operation 
of State Loan Fund. 
(a) The (X Legal Services Organization) shall establish and 
maintain a separate fund entitled the "State Loan Fund." 
(b) All loans made to (X) from the state shall be credited to 
the State Loan Fund of (X). The net asset value of said 
fund as determined by the treasurer shall always be equal to 
the outstanding loan balance due to the state at any given 
time. In determining the net asset value of such fund, the 
state treasurer may, at his discretion, take into 
consideration and value investments in the fund at the cost 
of (X), if in his opinion the market value is higher or lower 
than the cost because of fluctuating interest rates which are 
ofa short-term nature. The treasurer may invest this fund 
in any other fixed income, bond, and mortgage funds 
established pursuant to law, or in any other prudent source 
of investment, subject to the approval of the board of 
directors of X. The net income of the fund and surplus 
assets, over and above the net asset value equal to the 
amount of the outstanding balance of the state loans, may 
from time to time be transferred by the board of directors 
to any other fund of X to be used for the purposes of such 
fund. If at any time there exists a deficit in this fund, after 
valuating the assets as aforesaid, the treasurer shall report 
the same to the Governor. 
Section 3 
Accounting audit and reports. 
The accounts and books of the State Loan Fund of X shall 
be maintained by the treasurer and the facilities of his 
office shall be used for this purpose without charge to or 
contributions from X. The accounts of this fund shall be 
subject to annual audit by the State Auditors of Public 
Accounts. The board of directors may cause the accounts 
of the State Loan Fund to also be audited on an annual or 
other basis by a Certified Public Accountant. The treasurer 
shall annually report to the Governor the financial 
condition of the State Loan of X. 
Section 4 
The notes issued pursuant to this act are made 
and declared to be (a) legal investments for savings banks 
and trustees unless otherwise provided in the instrument 
creating the trust, (b) securities in which all public officers 
and bodies, all insurance companies and associations and 
persons carrying on an insurance business, all banks, 
bankers, trust companies, savings banks and savings 
associations, including savings and loan associations, 
building and loan associations, investment companies and 
persons carrying on a banking or investment business, all 
administrators, guardians, executors trustees and other 
fiduciaries and all persons whatsoever who are or may be 
authorized to invest in notes of the state, may properly and 
legally invest funds including capital in their control or 
belonging to them, and (c) securities which may be 
deposited with and shall be received by all public officers 
and bodies for any purpose for which the deposit of notes 
of the state is or may be authorized. All such notes, their 
transfer and the income therefrom including any profit on 
the sale or transfer thereof, shall at all times be exempt 
from all taxation by the state or under its authority. 
Section S 
This act shall take effect from its passage. 
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